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Risk perception is an important driver of netizens’ (Internet users’) cybersecurity 
behaviours, with a number of factors influencing its formation. It has been argued 
that the affect heuristic can be a source of variation in generic risk perception.  
However, a major shortcoming of the supporting research evidence for this assertion 
is that the central construct, affect, has not been measured or analysed.  Moreover, 
its influence in the cybersecurity domain has not yet been tested. The contribution of 
the research reported in this paper is thus, firstly, to test the affect heuristic while 
measuring its three constructs: affect, perceived risk and perceived benefit and, 
secondly, to test its impact in the cybersecurity domain.  By means of two carefully 
designed studies (N = 63 and N = 233), we provide evidence for the influence of the 
affect heuristic on risk perception in the cybersecurity domain. We conclude by 
identifying directions for future research into the role of affect and its impact on 
cybersecurity risk perception. 
Keywords: affect, risk perception, cybersecurity, benefit perception, affect heuristic 
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The huge advantages global citizens gain from being online are somewhat clouded 
by the significant risks they are exposed to while accessing online services (de Bruijn 
and Janssen, 2017). The World Economic Forum ranked cyber-attacks third in 
worldwide threats in 2018. In the UK, the Office for National Statistics1 reported that, 
during the year ending in March 2018, around 4.5 million cybercrimes were 
committed in England and Wales. In 2017, around 17 million UK residents fell victim 
to cybercrime, with losses of approximately £130 billion (Hern, 2018). Two in five UK 
businesses, too, were subjected to a cyber-attack in 2018 (HM Government, 2018a). 
These statistics are for a single country, but serve to demonstrate the scale of the 
problem. 
Being aware of this, the UK government (HM Government, 2018b) considers 
increasing cybersecurity skills to be one of their top priorities. This priority is reflected 
in the other Five Eyes governments’ strategy documents too (Public Safety Canada, 
2018; New Zealand Government, 2016; US Government, 2018; Australian 
Government, 2016). The government strategy documents refer specifically to the 
need for individuals to understand the risks and to know how to protect themselves 
online.  
It is indeed important for netizens (Internet citizens) to know the facts about online 
risks, because this has an influence on their ability to develop an informed 
perception of a particular risk (Hansson, 2010; Bodemer & Gaissmaier, 2015). In 
particular, people need to have an accurate perception of the risk. Risk perceptions 
predict uptake of precautionary cybersecurity behaviours (van Schaik et al., 2018), 
so efforts to inform citizens are indeed advisable. Yet facts and knowledge, on their 
own, do not reliably lead to accurate risk perceptions (Pidgeon et al., 1992; Cross, 
1998). Hansson (2010) explains that risk perception is both objective (fact-based) 
and subjective (socially constructed and emotional). It is important to understand the 
influences that inform risk perceptions because people will only take precautions if 
they have a genuine perception of the risks related to online activities (Slovic et al., 
1980).  
The uptake of precautionary behaviours can be modelled by protection motivation 
theory (PMT) (Rogers, 1975). PMT suggests that both threat and coping appraisals 
will influence people’s motivations to take precautionary measures against threats. 
According to the theory, the riskier a behaviour is perceived to be, the more likely it is 
that precautionary measures will be taken. The activity might also be avoided 
altogether if the risk is perceived to be too high (Lienard, 2011). PMT can help us to 
clarify individual variations in protective cybersecurity behaviours too, because we 
know that action-related decisions build on individual risk perceptions (Sjöberg et al., 
2004; Warkentin et al., 2012; Jansen & van Schaik, 2017a, 2017b, 2018a, 2018b, 
2018c).  
It is clearly important to understand netizens’ formation of cybersecurity risk 
perception, because this plays such a major role in prompting protective action. 
                                            
1
 https://www.ons.gov.uk/search?q=cyber 
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Accurate and objective risk perceptions will prompt deliberate precautionary actions 
by individuals (Renaud & Warkentin, 2017), organisations (Allodi & Massacci, 2017) 
and governments (Renaud et al., 2018).  
To engender risk perception accuracy, it is necessary to understand exactly how risk 
perceptions are formed and what factors influence them (Slovic et al., 1980; 
Hansson, 2010). Kühberger and Schulte-Mecklenbeck (2017) explain that risk 
perception is not purely a cognitive process, but that it is also informed by affective 
influences. Finucane et al. (2003) refer to this as the “dance of affect and reason”. In 
fact, Slovic et al. (2002) argue that affect is essential to rational action.  
Affect is a potentially powerful yet poorly investigated influence on risk perception 
(Slovic & Peters, 2006). Core affect is the central concept in Russell’s (2003) 
influential dimensional approach to studying affect and emotion (cited 2261/4560 
times, according to Scopus/Scholar, 9/9/2019).  The author explains affect as a 
simple feeling, core affect, to which at all times people have conscious access to; 
this is a mix of two dimensions: valence (pleasure-displeasure) and arousal 
(activation-deactivation).  Here, we use this approach to investigate the role of affect 
on cybersecurity-related risk perception. 
Although the Finucane et al.’s (2000) publication on the affect heuristic has been 
frequently cited (1313/2737 times, according to Scopus/Scholar, 9/9/2019) and has 
been invoked to explain risk perception and human behaviour, it remains a 
conjecture in the domain cybersecurity.  Therefore, the aim of the research reported 
here was directly to test the affect heuristic and its applicability to cybersecurity, with 
implications for our understanding of the role of affect in risk perception to inform 
cybersecurity practice.  We conducted two studies using Finucane et al.’s (2000) 
methods.  In our first study, we tested Finucane et al.’s (2000) first affect heuristic 
model; in our second study, we tested the second. 
Cybersecurity is a particularly pertinent issue in the UK, because 82% of the UK 
population shops online (CBS, 2018), and 94.78% of their population carries out 
online activities, one of the highest percentages in the world.  Therefore, we carried 
out our study on UK citizens. 
2. The affect heuristic in cybersecurity risk perception 
In the risk literature and PMT literature, risk perception has often been studied from a 
cognitive perspective (Loewenstein et al., 2001). Studies consider the impact of 
threat-related knowledge, voluntariness and control over exposure, newness, 
catastrophic potential and severity of consequences (van Schaik et al., 2017).  Yet 
cognitive evaluations only partially explain variations in risk perceptions and risk-
related decision-making (Loewenstein et al., 2001).  Therefore, the need for a 
different approach, in other words ‘risk as feelings’, has been proposed (Loewenstein 
et al., 2001). According to Loewenstein et al., risk judgment involves not only 
cognitive evaluations, but also affect as an essential influence. They argue that risk 
is not calculated, but based on affect. If risk perception is indeed based on affect, 
risk perception will not be subject to cognitive evaluations to the extent that cognitive 
accounts of judgement would lead us to believe.  Loewenstein et al. (2001) use the 
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terms “affect” and “feelings” interchangeably.  However, we focus on affect, the 
central concept in the affect heuristic, which is the subject of the current research.  
Here we adopt Russell’s (2003) influential conceptualisation of affect as discussed in 
the previous section.   
The affect heuristic has been proposed in domains other than cybersecurity, such as 
health and natural disasters, to explain variation in risk perception (Bowen et al., 
2004; Siegrist et al., 2006; Terpstra et al., 2009).  According to the affect heuristic, 
people’s perceptions of the risk of an activity or technology are influenced by their 
affect related to the activity.  In particular, Finucane et al. (2000) claim that the affect 
heuristic can explain the relationship between perceived risk and perceived benefit.  
According to the authors’ objective analysis, risk and benefit are positively correlated 
in the external world. However, in people’s risk perceptions of technologies and 
activities, risk and benefit are negatively correlated (Finucane et al., 2000).  The 
affect heuristic suggests that this is due to people’s affect triggered by these 
technologies and activities.  For example, if people feel that browsing the dark net is 
a good thing to do, they are likely to consider it beneficial and having low risk. 
Finucane et al. (2000) present two affect heuristic models and empirically evaluate 
these models with two experiments.  Perceptions of the risk and benefit of various 
technologies (e.g., nuclear power) outside of the cybersecurity domain were 
analysed.  According to their first affect heuristic model (Figure 1), the reason for the 
negative correlation between perceived risk and perceived benefit is that affect is 
both a negative determinant of perceived risk and a positive determinant of 
perceived benefit.  According to the second affect heuristic model, framing a 
message in terms of the risks of an activity (e.g., information about the risks posed 
by the use of a technology) leads to two consequences (Figure 2, Panel [a]).  First, 
the level of perceived risk acts as a negative determinant of affect.  Second, in turn, 
the level of affect acts as a positive determinant of perceived benefit.  Therefore, 
affect is a mediator of the effect of perceived risk on perceived benefit.  Similarly, 
when the message emphasises the beneficial nature of an activity, affect is a 
mediator of the negative effect of perceived benefit on perceived risk (Figure 2, 
Panel [b]). 
Although Finucane et al. (2000) present their results as evidence for the affect 
heuristic, they only provide indirect evidence. They did not directly test their two 
affect heuristic models.  In particular, they did not measure or analyse affect, even 
though this is the main factor in both models.  Moreover, to our knowledge, research 
reporting direct testing of the affect heuristic remains scarce outside of the domain of 
cybersecurity and has not been tested directly in cybersecurity. 
3. The current research 
Despite the limitations of affect-heuristic studies, cybersecurity research has invoked 
this heuristic as an explanation for variations in risk perceptions (Garg & Camp, 
2013).  For example, in cybersecurity, the malicious activities of insiders have been 
attributed to the affect heuristic (Farahmand & Spafford, 2013).  To our knowledge, 
the affect heuristic has not been tested in the domain of cybersecurity, neither 
indirectly (without measuring affect, as in Finucane et al. [2000]) nor directly (by 
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measuring and analysing the impact of affect on perceived risk and perceived 
benefit).  The current research is original by directly testing both of Finucane et al.’s 
affect heuristic models in cybersecurity.  The research is theoretically significant by 
testing these model-based explanations of risk perception and practically significant 
by presenting potential applications of the results to cybersecurity. 
4. Study 1: testing the affect heuristic with affect 
The aim of Study 1 is to test Finucane et al.’s (2000) first affect heuristic model 
(Figure 1), where affect is a negative determinant of perceived risk and a positive 
determinant of perceived benefit. 
4.1. Method 
4.1.1. Research design 
The design is based on that of Finucane et al.’s (2000) Study 1.  However, the 
design is novel. First, its focus is specifically on cybersecurity threats, in addition to 
other threats.  Second, in order to allow us to fully test the first affect heuristic model, 
affect was measured.  This is essential in extending Finucane et al.’s (2000) 
research, to more completely validate their model.  The measured variables are (1) 
perceived risk, (2) perceived benefit and (3) affect.  The order of risk rating and 
benefit rating was counterbalanced (risk followed by benefit or vice versa). 
4.1.2. Participants 
Participants were recruited through a large UK online survey panel (June-July 2018).  
All panel members aged 18 or over were eligible and these were automatically 
invited by the panel organisers. There were 63 participants (exceeding Finucane et 
al.’s [2000] sample size of 54).  The sample was balanced in terms of gender 
(female/male split: 51%/49%).  Mean age was 51.19 (SD = 13.08), with a range of 22 
to 79.  Most participants’ highest level of completed education was high-school 
diploma or equivalent (43%) or degree (33%). Most participants were employed 
(57%) or retired (25%).  A majority used the Internet three times or more per day 
(60%) and most spent several hours (46%) or one hour (24%) per day using the 
Internet. 
4.1.3. Stimuli and measurement 
Stimuli (Appendix 1) were 14 Facebook privacy- and security settings (S1-14) 
studied by Van Schaik et al. (2018), 2 non-cybersecurity-related Internet activities 
(S15-16), 3 further cybersecurity-related Internet activities analysed in Study 2 (S17-
19) and a subset of 3 (S20-S22) out of 23 activities/technologies also studied by 
Finucane et al. (2000).  Another 3, out of 23 activities/technologies from Finucane et 
al. (2000), were used as practice stimuli (Appendix 2). 
Perceived risk and perceived benefit were measured using 7-point Likert scales (as 
in Finucane et al., 2000), with end-points ‘not at all risky (beneficial)’ and ‘very risky 
(beneficial)’ (see Appendix 2).  Although Finucane et al. (2000) did not measure or 
analyse affect, this is essential in testing affect heuristic models.  More 
fundamentally, the authors did not theoretically specify the affect concept.  We adopt 
Russell’s (1980) influential circumplex model of human affect to conceptualise affect 
(5915/11728 citations according to Scopus/Google Scholar, 9/9/2019).  The model 
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has two dimensions: valence, ranging from miserable to happy, and arousal, ranging 
from sleepy to aroused.  We used a 5-point self-assessment manikin for measuring 
valence and arousal (Bradley & Lang, 1994).  We understand Finucane et al.’s 
(2000) conceptualisation of affect as valence, but we analysed both valence and 
arousal to demonstrate specificity of the affect heuristic to valence. 
4.1.4. Procedure 
Affect was measured in all affect-rating trials before either risk or benefit ratings for 
all stimuli.  This is because, according to the first affect heuristic model, the 
determinant (affect) needs to precede the consequents (risk and benefit).  For each 
participant, the order of stimulus presentation was randomised, but (once 
randomised) the same order was used for affect rating, risk rating and benefit rating.  
This was to ensure a constant gap (of 22 - 1 =) 21 stimuli between the affect rating 
and the risk/benefit rating, and between the risk/benefit rating and the benefit/risk 
rating).  Therefore, in the affect-rating trials S1-S22 were presented in random order.  
Then, in the risk rating trials, the same stimuli were presented in the same order, 
followed by the benefit rating trials (or vice versa when benefit rating trials came 
first). 
4.2. Results and discussion 
To test the first affect heuristic model, Pearson’s correlation r was analysed between 
valence and, (1) risk (negative correlation hypothesised) and (2) benefit (positive 
correlation hypothesised).  In support of the hypothesis for risk, the correlation with 
valence was negative, with an average correlation over stimuli of -0.40 (Figure 3), 
bootstrapped BCa CI(0.95) = [-0.46; -0.35].  In support of the hypothesis for benefit, 
the correlation with valence was positive, with an average correlation of 0.52 (Figure 
4), bootstrapped BCa CI(0.95) = [0.44; 0.60].  Nonetheless, when benefit was 
partialled out, the correlation between risk and valence reduced to a small effect 
size, pr = -0.22, on average (Figure 3).  Similarly, when risk was partialled out, the 
correlation between benefit and valence reduced, but to a lesser extent, to medium-
sized effect, pr = 0.43, on average (Figure 4).  In the light of these results, support for 
the hypothesis for risk was clearly reduced and limited, but support for the 
hypothesis for benefit remains relatively strong. 
For comparison with Finucane et al.’s (2000) results, we also calculated the 
correlation between risk and benefit per stimulus.  They presented these correlations 
as evidence for the model, but did not measure or analyse the main factor affect.  
Therefore, their results can, at best, provide only indirect evidence for the 
hypothesis.  In support of their results, we found negative correlations, with an 
average of -0.46 (Figure 5), bootstrapped BCa CI(0.95) = [-0.51; -0.40].  
Nevertheless, in our analysis, 13 out of the 19 correlations between risk and benefit 
remained medium-sized or large and statistically significant when affect was 
partialled out, with an average of -0.29 (Figure 5).  Consequently, although affect 
may be a determinant of both perceived risk and perceived benefit (even though the 
evidence for risk is limited, according to the results presented above), this does not 
imply that affect fully explains the shared variance between risk and benefit.  
However, this was precisely Finucane et al.’s (2000) implicit assumption and their 
basis for interpreting their results as support for the affect heuristic.  By contrast, with 
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our analysis of the correlations between affect and risk and between affect and 
benefit, we directly test and provide appropriate evidence for the first affect heuristic 
model.   
An analysis by stimulus category (Figure 6) shows that for most categories the 
correlations of valence with risk and valence with benefit were substantial (> 0.32), 
providing evidence for the affect heuristic.  The exceptions were security settings for 
access to shared information in Facebook (e.g., keep a restricted list of friends) and 
hacking.  We notice large discrepancies in the pattern of correlations between risk 
and benefit, on the one hand, and either valence and risk, or valence and benefit 
(e.g., for hacking), on the other.  Therefore, if we were to purely use the correlation 
between risk and benefit (as Finucane et al. [2000] did) rather than the correlations 
between valence and risk and between valence and benefit, we would incorrectly 
conclude that there is substantial evidence for the affect heuristic for some of the 
stimuli.  We would also incorrectly conclude the opposite for some other stimuli.  In 
particular, support for the affect heuristic would be substantially overestimated for 
hacking and keeping a restricted list of friends (large correlation between risk and 
benefit, but small correlations between valence and risk and between valence and 
benefit).  However, support would be substantially underestimated for allowing 
others to post on timeline and allowing all old posts to be shared (large correlations 
between valence and risk and between valence and benefit, but small correlation 
between risk and benefit). 
To demonstrate the specificity of valence as the main affect dimension, we 
conducted an analysis of correlations and partial correlations again, but now with 
valence replaced by arousal (the other affect dimension in Russell’s circumplex 
model of affect).  The pattern of results for arousal (presented in Appendix 3) was 
clearly different from that for valence.  In particular, correlations and partial 
correlations between arousal and risk were negligible (average absolute values < 
0.05) rather than medium-size and small, respectively, when valence was analysed.  
Correlations and partial correlations between arousal and benefit were small 
(average values 0.12) rather than large and medium-sized, respectively, when 
valence was analysed.  The average correlation between risk and benefit remained 
unchanged when arousal was partialled out rather than reduced, when valence was 
partialled out.  Therefore, the evidence for the first affect heuristic model is specific to 
the affect dimension of valence. 
5. Study 2: testing the affect heuristic with affect and framing 
The aim of Study 2 is to test Finucane et al.’s (2000) second affect heuristic model 
(Figure 2).  In this model, the effect of perceived risk (benefit) on perceived benefit 
(risk) is mediated by affect. 
5.1. Method 
5.1.1. Research design 
The experimental design is based on that of Finucane et al.’s (2000) Study 2.  
However, the design is novel. First, the focus is on cybersecurity-related activities.  
Second, in order to allow us to fully test the second affect heuristic model, affect was 
measured and analysed in relation to risk and benefit.  This is the main factor in the 
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model, but was not studied by Finucane et al. (2000); therefore, they were not able 
fully to validate their model. 
Specifically, a mixed, 2 (domain: risk/benefit information)-by-2 (extent: high 
risk/benefit, low risk/benefit)-by-(4) (technology/activity: social network/social media, 
online banking, online gaming, nuclear power), design was used.  The first two 
factors were used between subjects and the last factor within subjects.  There were 
four experiment versions: (1) high risk, (2) low risk, (3) high benefit and (4) low 
benefit.  The effect of risk or benefit framing information was analysed.  In the 
analysis of the design per activity/technology, the dependent variables were 
perceived risk and perceived benefit. 
In the analysis of the second affect heuristic model, the predictor was perceived risk 
and the outcome variable was perceived benefit in the high-risk- and low-risk 
conditions.  The predictor was perceived benefit and the outcome variable was 
perceived risk in the high-benefit and low-benefit conditions.  In both analyses, the 
mediator was affect. 
5.1.2. Participants 
Participants were recruited through a large UK online survey panel (July-August 
2018).  All panel members aged 18 or over were eligible and these were 
automatically invited by the panel organisers.  There were 233 participants (n = 59, 
62, 56 and 56 in the four experimental conditions, respectively, and exceeding 
Finucane et al.’s total sample size of 213).  The sample was balanced in terms of 
gender (female/male split: 50%/50%).  Mean age was 52.13 (SD = 13.13), with a 
range of 22 to 79.  Most participants’ highest level of completed education was high-
school diploma or equivalent (41%) or degree (31%).  Most participants were 
employed (52%) or retired (20%).  A majority used the Internet three times or more 
per day (54%) and most spent several hours (42%) or one hour (23%) per day using 
the Internet. 
5.1.3. Stimuli and measurement 
The stimuli were activities/technologies.  Three of these were cybersecurity-related 
(S1: online social network/social media; S2: online banking; S3: online gaming); a 
fourth, non-cybersecurity, technology (S4: nuclear power) was previously studied by 
Finucane et al. (2000).  The following types of framing were used: high risk, low risk, 
high benefit and low benefit (see Appendix 4).  Perceived risk, perceived benefit and 
affect were measured as in Study 1. 
5.1.4. Procedure 
During each trial, a stimulus (technology/activity) was presented with a description of 
the technology framed either in terms of risk (low or high) or benefit (low or high). 
In high- and low-risk conditions, the risk rating for each stimulus preceded the affect 
rating (not included in Finucane et al., 2000), followed by the benefit rating.  This is 
because, according to the model, the determinant risk needs to precede the 
consequent affect and, in turn, the mediator affect needs to precede the consequent 
benefit. 
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In the high- and low-benefit conditions, the benefit rating for each stimulus preceded 
affect rating (not included in Finucane et al., 2000), followed by the risk rating.  This 
is because, according to the model, the determinant benefit needs to precede the 
consequent affect and, in turn, the mediator affect needs to precede the consequent 
risk.  In all conditions, the order of stimulus presentation was randomised per 
participant. 
5.2. Results and discussion 
5.2.1. Analysis of message effect 
The effect of the framing of risk and benefit was tested with 2-way analysis of 
variance (ANOVA) for each stimulus. 
5.2.1.1 Perceived risk 
For nuclear power, the main effect of extent (F [1, 229] = 12.22, p < 0.001, pes = 
0.05) and the interaction effect between extent and domain (risk or benefit) (F [1, 
229] = 14.19, p < 0.001, pes = 0.06; see also Figure 7) were significant.  Perceived 
risk was higher under the high-risk condition than under the low-risk condition, but 
the difference was exceedingly small between the two benefit conditions.   
For social media, the main effect of domain (risk or benefit) was significant (F [1, 
229] = 5.02, p = 0.03, pes = 0.02; see also Figure 7).  Perceived risk was higher 
under the risk conditions and the difference between the high-risk and the low-risk 
condition was exceedingly small. 
For online banking, the interaction effect between extent and domain (risk or benefit) 
(F [1, 229] = 7.41, p = 0.01, pes = 0.03; see also Figure 7) was significant.  
Perceived risk was higher under the high-risk condition than under the low-risk 
condition, but the difference was between the two benefit conditions was in the 
opposite direction.   
For online gaming, neither the main effects of domain (F < 1) and extent (F [1, 229] = 
2.58, p = 0.11, pes = 0.01) nor the interaction effect (F < 1) were significant. 
5.2.1.2 Perceived benefit 
For nuclear power, the interaction effect between domain (risk or benefit) and extent 
was significant (F [1, 229] = 6.62, p = 0.01, pes = 0.03; see also Figure 8).  
Perceived benefit was higher under the high-benefit condition than under the low-
benefit condition, but the difference was small under the two risk conditions.   
For social media, neither the main effects of domain (F [1, 229] = 3.50, p = 0.06, pes 
= 0.02) and extent (F < 1) nor the interaction effect (F < 1) were significant. 
For online banking, the interaction effect between domain (risk or benefit) and extent 
was significant (F [1, 229] = 4.89, p = 0.02, pes = 0.03; see also Figure 8).  
Perceived benefit was higher under the high-benefit condition than under the low-
benefit condition.   
For online gaming, the main effect of domain (risk or benefit) on perceived benefit 
was significant (F [1, 229] = 6.74, p = 0.01, pes = 0.03; see also Figure 8).  
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Perceived benefit was higher under the benefit conditions and the difference 
between the high-benefit and the low-benefit condition was exceedingly small. 
In sum, framing was fully effective for nuclear power and online banking, as the 
interaction effect of domain and extent were significant on perceived risk and 
perceived benefit.  Framing was partially effective for social media and online 
gaming (significant effect of domain for both).  Another important observation is that, 
as expected, the pattern of results for risk and benefit differed.  For example, for 
online banking, the effect of risk extent (low or high) increased perceived risk, but the 
effect of extent of benefit (low or high) did not increase perceived risk. At the same 
time, the effect of benefit extent (low or high) increased perceived benefit, but the 
effect of extent of risk (low or high) did not increase perceived benefit. 
5.2.2. Analysis of the affect heuristic 
According to Finucane et al.’s (2000) second affect heuristic model, perceived risk 
(benefit) is a determinant of perceived benefit (risk), and this effect is mediated by 
affect.  Mediation analysis was conducted to test this conjecture. 
5.2.2.1. Mediation of the effect of risk on benefit 
Mediation of the effect of perceived risk on perceived benefit by affect was analysed 
with mediation analysis for high- and low-risk conditions separately.  Six out of the 
eight analyses showed a significant negative indirect effect of perceived risk on 
perceived benefit (Figures 9-12).  Over the eight analyses, the average size of the 
indirect effect was -0.25, CI(0.95) = [-0.49; -0.01].  Therefore, the results provide 
evidence for the second research model when perceived risk drives perceived 
benefit. 
5.2.2.2. Mediation of the effect of benefit on risk 
Mediation of the effect of perceived benefit on perceived risk by affect was analysed 
with mediation analysis for high- and low-benefit conditions separately. Four out of 
the eight analyses showed a significant negative indirect effect of perceived risk on 
perceived benefit (Figures 9-12).  Over the eight analyses, the average size of the 
indirect effect was -0.20, CI(0.95) = [-0.58; 0.18].  Therefore, results provide mixed 
evidence for the second affect research model when perceived benefit drives 
perceived risk. 
In sum, the mediation of the negative effect of risk on benefit was more consistent 
than the mediation of the negative effect of benefit on risk.  The significant mediated 
effects were indirect-only (Zhao et al., 2010), in other words the effect of risk was 
fully mediated by affect, consistent with the affect heuristic.  Here, the exception was 
the competitive mediation (Zhao et al., 2010) in the low-benefit frame for nuclear 
power.  This indirect negative effect is consistent with the affect heuristic, but the 
direct positive effect is consistent with the idea that, in the real world, risk and benefit 
are positively correlated (Finucane et al., 2000).  Even in the non-significant 
mediation effects of risk and those of benefit, the pattern was consistent with the 
affect heuristic: the indirect effect was negative and the confidence interval over the 
eight analyses was skewed towards negative values.   
To show the specificity of valence as the main affect dimension, we conducted the 
mediation analyses again, but now with valence replaced by arousal (the other affect 
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dimension in Russell’s circumplex model of affect).  The pattern of results (Appendix 
5) for arousal was clearly different from that for valence.  In particular, there was no 
consistent evidence for mediation, as only 1 of the 15 indirect (mediated) effects was 
significant.  Therefore, the evidence for the second affect heuristic model is specific 
to the valence dimension of affect. 
6. General discussion 
We carried out two studies to test the affect heuristic as proposed by Finucane et al. 
(2000). In particular, our studies sought to include measurements of affect, both in 
terms of valence and arousal, and to assess their impact on risk and benefit 
perceptions. We carried out these studies in the cybersecurity domain because it is 
crucial for us to understand how best to ensure that people have an accurate 
perception of both the risks and benefits of engaging with the online world. PMT 
suggests that accurate risk perceptions are likely to prompt people to take 
appropriate precautions while they enjoy the benefits of online activities.  However, 
according to the affect heuristic, these perceptions are influenced by people’s affect 
in response to the technology that is involved in the activity.  We tested the impact of 
both of affect’s constituent parts in our studies: valence and arousal, to determine 
whether either or both were influential in informing risk and benefit perceptions in the 
cybersecurity domain, within both of Finucane et al.’s (2000) proposed models.  
The results of our first study did indeed support the first affect heuristic model with 
direct evidence in terms of impact of affect valence on perceived benefit, but its 
impact on risk was small enough for us to question the role of valence in informing 
risk perceptions. The impact of arousal on perceived risk and benefit, however, 
ranged from negligible to small. We found small to medium correlations between 
perceived risk and perceived benefit, which provides some indirect evidence for 
Finucane et al.’s (2000) first model.  However, there were some inconsistencies 
between the two, empirically demonstrating the fallacy of testing the model by 
analysing the correlation between perceived risk and perceived benefit. 
Our second study tested Finucane et al.’s (2000) second affect heuristic model 
within the cybersecurity domain. Here, our findings were not as convincing. We did 
find evidence for risk perception’s influence on benefit perception, mediated by affect 
valence. Yet there was less compelling evidence of impact of benefit perception on 
risk perception mediated by affect valence, at least for the scenarios we used. Once 
again, we did not find evidence for mediation by arousal. In sum, our findings for 
affect mediating between perceived risk and perceived benefit apply only variably to 
affect valence (i.e. not for all scenarios). 
6.1. The applicability of the affect heuristic to cybersecurity 
Now that we understand the impact of affect valence on perceived risk and 
perceived benefit, we can consider how these findings can inform cybersecurity risk 
communication.   
It might seem obvious that making people feel aroused by delivering a fear appeal 
message would lead to their taking precautions to reduce this experienced arousal. 
A number of authors have indeed suggested using fear appeals to encourage 
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cybersecurity behaviours (Herath & Rao, 2009; Johnson & Warkentin, 2010; Liang & 
Xue, 2010; Ifinedo, 2012; Posey et al., 2011; Boss et al., 2015). Yet, our finding that 
affect arousal does not reliably inform perceived risk suggests that such arousal-
based appeals might not be particularly effective in reality. Marett et al. (2019) tested 
the impact of fear appeals regarding ransomware and discovered that too-vivid 
messages could lead to maladaptive rather than protective responses, which seems 
to confirm our finding.  
On the other hand, the fact that affect valence impacts perceived benefit, and that 
perceived benefit and perceived risk are negatively correlated (Study 1) is 
concerning in the cybersecurity domain. In effect, the lure of a particular risky activity 
could lead to a heightened perceived benefit, which could, in turn, dampen down 
perceived risk so that the person will not take sensible precautions. Indeed, Rhodes 
and Pivik (2011) found exactly this effect for risky driving. A liking for the activity led 
to reduced risk perceptions, and a discounting of the true risks of the activity. It 
seems that the perceived benefit was so heightened by liking that the perceived risk 
was dampened down so that it no longer mattered.  
The fact that affect’s mediation of the negative effect of perceived risk on perceived 
benefit was more consistent than the mediation of the positive effect of perceived 
benefit on perceived risk also has implications for cybersecurity messaging. Indeed, 
De Bruijn and Janssen (2017) make this very point in their insightful paper. This 
finding could skew the affect heuristic’s predicted inverse relationship between 
perceived benefit and perceived risk. For example, a risky online service could offer 
someone an enticement to persuade them to use it (high perceived benefit leading to 
low perceived risk). A subsequent security warning message (inducing negative 
affect) could well lead them to question the advantages offered by the service 
(reduced benefit). The intervention might serve to amplify perceived risk 
disproportionally so that they discontinue usage, due to this skewed relationship, 
instead of engaging in a thoughtful and rational trade-off of risk and benefit. 
Essentially, the negative affect induced by heightened perceived risk is more 
influential than the positive affect triggered by perceived benefit.  
6.2. The applicability of the “risk-as-feelings” hypothesis  
Loewenstein et al. (2001) coined the term “risk as feelings”. Their paper has made a 
huge academic impact (2780/5667 citations, according to Scopus/Scholar 9/9/2019). 
Yet, in other recent risk-related reviews, affect is not mentioned (Renn & Benighaus, 
2013). Still, a number of researchers have carried out studies to measure the role of 
affect in risk perception in non-cybersecurity domains (Mathur & Levy, 2013; Lerner 
et al., 2015; Cottingham & Fisher, 2016), which prompted our interest in its impact in 
cybersecurity.  
There is a potentially confounding factor in affect heuristic studies. Sometimes 
studies state that they are measuring affect’s impact on risk, but the instruments they 
use seem to test emotions rather than affect (Keller et al., 2006; Taylor & Snyder, 
2017).  Russell’s influential conceptualisation of affect (2003) provides clarity by 
distinguishing affect and emotion within a unified framework.  First the author 
explains affect as a simple feeling, core affect, to which at all times people have 
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conscious access to; this is a mix of two dimensions: valence (pleasure-displeasure) 
and arousal (activation-deactivation).  Second, according to Russell, an emotional 
episode consists of several components, including core affect, antecedent event, 
affective quality, attribution, appraisal, instrumental action, physiological and 
expressive changes, subjective conscious experiences and emotional meta-
experience.  In Russell’s dimensional approach to conceptualizing affect, core affect 
can be measured without necessarily being confounded by emotions (Bradley & 
Lang, 1994).  This is the approach that we have followed in the current research by 
measuring affect with validated scales to capture both valence and arousal. 
We know that people tend to judge hazards based on how they feel about them, and 
not based on a cognitive and objective assessment of the actual risks (Slovic and 
Peters, 2006; Bearth and Siegrist, 2016). Our study provided some confirmation of 
this in the cybersecurity domain.  
Researchers have investigated the impact of the affect heuristic in other areas. For 
example, in their study of product innovations, King and Slovic (2014) found that 
where people were uncertain about risks or benefits, they relied on affect to make 
judgements. The triggering of the affect heuristic is also indicated when decision 
making is complex or when psychological resources are limited (Wu et al., 2018). In 
cybersecurity, the risks are often uncertain and the context complex, which could 
lead people to rely on affect instead of objectively evaluating actual probabilities.  
In the field of gene technology, Siegrist and Sütterlin (2016) showed that a pre-
existing attitude towards a particular technology would bias people’s assessment of 
the risks and benefits of the technology, because of the heuristic affect. They 
demonstrated that even if people were given accurate information about risk, they 
interpreted it differently. Wu et al. (2018) refer to “external emotions” having an 
impact on the assessment. Hine et al. (2007) found supporting evidence for the 
affect heuristic related to the health risks of wood-burning fires. They discovered that 
people who owned wood-burning heaters had more positive associations (pre-
existing positive affect), and this led to their downplaying the risks. 
We also have to acknowledge differences in perspectives. Denscombe (2010) found 
that teenagers were reluctant to condemn their peers who smoked. They explain that 
the priorities of the authorities cannot be assumed to match the concerns of people 
being targeted with a risk-related message.  Västfjäll et al. (2014) explain that “affect, 
accessible thoughts and motivational states influence perceptions of risks and 
benefits” (p. 527). Denscombe’s findings reflect this: the motivations of the 
authorities are to reduce smoking; the young people are more focused on their group 
membership and their desire not to demonise one of their own. Assuming that 
everyone will respond in the same way to a particular risk is naïve: the same 
message will invoke different affects, and hence different judgements.  
Extrapolating from this, consider that a cybersecurity expert presents people with 
accurate information about the benefits of using a particular technology in the cyber 
domain. A pre-existing affect invoked by negative encounters with the technology 
might lead to the message failing to adjust perceptions as anticipated. For example, 
a message focused on the benefits of encryption might trigger a negative affect. The 
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person might not necessarily accept any proclaimed benefits, due to negative affect 
related to previous experiences of complexity and usage difficulties related to 
encryption technologies. 
Watson et al. (2017) carried out an investigation into unlawful file sharing 
behaviours. They discovered that the affect heuristic also came into play in this 
domain. Perceived benefit reduced perceptions of risk so that information about the 
legal risks did not have much of an impact. They recommend that this kind of illegal 
activity be addressed by focusing attention on benefits of lawful alternatives rather 
than by focusing on trying to increase risk perceptions.  
A study into the impact of communicating the risks and benefits of cancer tests to 
patients is reported by Scherer et al. (2018). Their findings, like ours, were that affect 
played a role in how people responded differently to receiving information about the 
risks or benefits of medical tests. In particular, they report that risk-related 
information reduced perceived benefit, as predicted by the affect heuristic. On the 
other hand, information about uncertainty of benefit did not impact perceived risk to 
the same extent. 
6.3. Results in relation to existing models of human behaviour 
Researchers have modelled the impact of other factors on risk and benefit 
perception. For example, Ganzach (2000) validates a model based on familiarity. He 
proposes the models shown in Figure 13.  The first model depicts the impact of 
global preference (affect) on perceived risk and return (benefit), with unfamiliar 
stimuli; this corresponds to the first affect heuristic model.  The second model 
represents the effect of perceived risk and return on global preference with familiar 
stimuli.  This is a variation on the second affect heuristic model, under conditions 
when objective information is available about both risk and benefit.  
Other researchers have investigated the role of experience in risk perception (De 
Dominicis et al., 2015; Golman et al., 2015; Raue et al., 2018). Researchers have 
studied the impact of experience from the inference perspective (Ganzach, 2000; 
Hassenzahl & Monk, 2010; van Schaik et al., 2012), anchoring and adjustment 
(Kahneman, 2011) and the theory of process memory (Vedadi & Warkentin, 2018).  
Siegrist et al. (2000) investigated the role of social trust and found that social trust is 
a major predictive factor of perceived risks and benefits of a technology. Kim et al. 
(2015) also investigated risk perception in the context of social networking. Their 
finding was that the act of establishing a new link would lead to heightened risk 
perceptions, whereas those who acted to cement existing relationships would not 
experience this effect. This might go some way towards explaining our findings 
regarding access to shared information in Facebook, which were unlike those of 
other risky behaviours. 
Slovic (2004) compares and contrasts experiential and analytic systems of thinking, 
and his analysis suggests that affect comes to play in the former, but not in the latter. 
These two systems of thinking act in parallel to inform our decisions. Pachur and 
Hertwig (2012) found evidence for the affect heuristic as well as the availability 
heuristic working in combination in informing decision-making. Finucane and Holup 
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(2006) suggest that “risk as feelings” and “risk as analysis” combine to lead to a 
“risk-as-value” judgement. Other factors can also play a role in informing risk 
perception, such as age (Finucane, 2008), gender (Gustafsod, 1998), attachment 
(Renaud et al., 2019) and liking (Rhodes & Pivik, 2011). The affect heuristic is thus 
merely one factor influencing risk perception and feeding, together with other factors, 
into the complexity of the human brain to generate an eventual perception of both 
risk and benefit.  Therefore, combining affect and other factors such as experience 
and social trust may be fruitful in future cybersecurity research on risk perception. 
Pham and Avnet (2009) found that affect is relied on far more when the focus is 
promotion rather than prevention. Higgins (1987) explains that regulatory-focus 
theory specifies the existence of two distinct systems: promotion and prevention. The 
former is involved with regulating growth and cultivation. The latter, prevention, is 
concerned with protection and security. In particular, as Pham and Avnet (2009) 
explain, how goals are pursued differs between these two regulatory systems. 
Promotion is approach-oriented whereas prevention is avoidance-oriented. 
Promotion suggests a strategy of exploration and seizing of opportunities whereas 
prevention is essentially vigilance-focused and cautionary. Because the usual 
cybersecurity messages focus on prevention (Ayala, 2016; Holland and Shey, 2015; 
Williams et al., 2018), messages prompting negative affect, as Sunstein (2003) 
advises, might not be the best way of discouraging risky behaviours and promoting 
precautionary behaviour in the cybersecurity context. 
All of these studies highlight the importance of decision context when considering 
risk perception, as emphasised by Bateman et al. (2007) and Leiserowitz (2006). 
This underlines the difficulty of studying affect using surveys – context cannot be as 
rich and informative as it is when real life decisions are made.  Future studies may 
therefore benefit from studying affect in (simulated) real-world situations. 
7. Conclusion and Future Work 
In this paper, we present original research that directly tests both of Finucane et al.’s 
affect heuristic models in cybersecurity.  Our research is theoretically significant by 
testing these model-based explanations of risk perception and practically significant 
by presenting potential applications of the results to cybersecurity.  Specifically, we 
present two controlled studies that we carried out to test the validity of the two affect 
heuristic models proposed by Finucane et al. (2000) in the cybersecurity domain. 
Our results provide support for the first model, in particular, first, through direct 
evidence (the impact of affect valence on risk- and benefit perception, as specified 
by the model) and, second, indirect evidence (the correlation between risk- and 
benefit perception, not specified by the model).  However, there were some 
inconsistencies between the two, empirically demonstrating the flaw of testing the 
model by analysing the correlation between perceived risk and perceived benefit.  
The evidence for the second model was variable, with evidence for risk perception’s 
influence on benefit perception mediated by affect valence.  Furthermore, only affect 
valence (but not arousal) had an impact on risk perception in both studies. 
A number of future research directions are suggested by this research. First, we 
need to design experiments to test cybersecurity message designs that do not aim to 
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arouse, but rather aim to encourage precaution uptake by focusing on the benefits 
thereof. This is because affect is more impactful in a promotion-based mindset 
(Pham and Avnet, 2009). Second, Sunstein (2003) argues that if the affect heuristic 
has an impact on risk perception, we should be able to alter affect and thereby 
change the perception. Indeed, Slovic (2004) explains that this is exactly what 
marketers and advertisers do.  Sunstein cites LeDoux (2003) and Nussbaum (2003) 
to make the point about the way cognition can be changed by alterations in 
emotions. This, too, might be a fruitful avenue for future investigations in the 
cybersecurity domain. 
Third, it would be beneficial to repeat these studies with a new set of risky 
cybersecurity behaviours so as to establish the generality of the findings.  More 
generally, the extent to which the affect heuristic is generally applicable to the 
cybersecurity domain can be tested by establishing boundary conditions.  For 
example, according to the person-artefact task model (Finneran and Zhang, 2003), it 
is worth exploring whether the affect heuristic holds across different persons 
(familiarity of users with Internet activities and technologies), artefacts (Internet 
activities and technologies [a number of which were included in our studies]; the 
reliability and effectiveness of technologies in goal achievement), and task 
characteristics (type of use [e.g. hedonic or goal-oriented, Van Schaik & Ling, 2009]; 
the frequency and duration of using the technologies).  Furthermore, in 
organisational computer use,  does the power of the affect heuristic vary across 
different organisational contexts?   
This research contributes to the body of knowledge related to the impact of the affect 
heuristic.  Future decisions and choices in cybersecurity need to be based on 
relevant theories and models and with this research we support the cumulative 
knowledge building that can facilitate and inform this process. 
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Figure 1.  First affect heuristic model. 
  







Figure 2.  Second affect heuristic model. 
  





Figure 3. Correlations and partial correlations of valence with perceived risk (Study 
1). 
  





Figure 4. Correlations and partial correlations of valence with perceived benefit 
(Study 1). 
  





Figure 5. Correlations and partial correlations of perceived risk with perceived benefit 
(Study 1). 
  





Figure 6. Correlations and partial correlations of risk and benefit with valence (Study 
1).  rVR: correlation between valence and risk. rRB: correlation between risk and 
benefit. rVB: correlation between valence and benefit. 
  





Figure 7. Perceived risk as a function of risk- and benefit information (Study 2). 
  





Figure 8. Perceived benefit as a function of risk- and benefit information (Study 2). 
  





Figure 9. Mediation analysis, nuclear power – mediator: valence (Study 2). 
  





Figure 10. Mediation analysis, social media – mediator: valence (Study 2). 
  





Figure 11. Mediation analysis, online banking – mediator: valence (Study 2). 
  





Figure 12. Mediation analysis, online gaming – mediator: valence (Study 2). 
  






Figure 13. .  







Figure A3.1. Correlations and partial correlations of risk and benefit with arousal 
(Study 1).  rAR: correlation between arousal and risk. rRB: correlation between risk 
and benefit. rAB: correlation between arousal and benefit. 
  





Figure A5.1. Mediation analysis, nuclear power – mediator: arousal (Study 2). 
  





Figure A5.2. Mediation analysis, social media – mediator: arousal (Study 2). 
  





Figure A5.3. Mediation analysis, online banking – mediator: arousal (Study 2). 
  





Figure A5.4. Mediation analysis, online gaming – mediator: arousal (Study 2). 
Note: colour should not be used for any figures in print. 
  




         
